What is the semantics of Negation-as-Failure in logic programming? We try to answer this question by proof-theoretic methods. A rule based sequent calculus is used in which a sequent is provable if, and only if, it is true in all three-valued models of the completion of a logic program. The main theorem is that proofs in the sequent calculus can be transformed into SLDNF-computations if, and only if, a program has the cut-property. A fragment of the sequent calculus leads to a sound and complete semantics for SLDNFresolution with substitutions. It turns out that this version of SLDNF-resolution is sound and complete with respect to three-valued possible world models of the completion for arbitrary logic programs and arbitrary goals. Since we are dealing with possibly nonterminating computations and constructive proofs, three-valued possible world models seem to be an appropriate semantics.
Introduction
In [5] Clark gives a constructive method for reformulating an SLDNF-computation as a deduction from the completion of a program. This gives a validation of the Negation-as-Failure rule, it is just a derived inference rule for deductions from the completion of a program. But what about the converse? Given a deduction from the completion of a program, is there also a corresponding SLDNF-computation? Is there a transformation of a formal deduction from the completion of a program into an SLDNF-computation? For definite programs (programs without negation) the transformation is easy and well-known. It can be done via cut-elimination or normalization (see [9, 11, 14] ). However, if the program contains negation then the known methods cannot be applied. In general, the transformation is impossible.
The solution is to use three-valued logic instead of classical logic. Then one obtains a strong correspondence between sequent proofs and SLDNF-computations for logic programs with negation. What do we mean here by three-valued logic? We take the Gentzen sequent calculus for the completion of a program but omit axioms of the form A ⊃ A. Instead of these we use equality axioms for unification, together with the following rules for the program clauses of a program P , where we assume that the completed definition of R in P is ∀ x (R( x ) ↔ D R [ x ]).
We call this calculus C3(P ). In [30] , we have shown that a sequent is provable in C3(P ) if, and only if, it is true in all three-valued models of the completion of P . Thus this sequent calculus is just a formalization of the three-valued approach to logic programming proposed by Fitting in [7] .
Obviously SLDNF-computations can be formalized in the calculus. The converse is not possible in general. So it is still not the case that every sequent proof corresponds to an SLDNF-computation. But we have found a necessary and sufficient condition on a program such that it is possible to transform a sequent proof into an SLDNF-computation. The transformation is possible if, and only if, a program has the so called cut-property.
For the transformation we use proof-theoretic methods. And this is one of the main points of this paper. We want to show how the well-developed methods of proof theory can be used to solve problems of computer science. We will use cutelimination to solve the problem of the semantics of Negation-as-Failure.
The method of cut-elimination goes back to Gentzen. In general a proof of a formula can contain other formulas of arbitrary complexity. But after applying Gentzen's cut-elimination procedure one obtains a proof in which the complexity of the formulas is bounded by the end formula. Usually, the new proof can be used to show that the end formula has the expected properties.
In the case of SLDNF-resolution, we proceed in the following way. If a goal is a three-valued consequence of the completion, then it is provable in the sequent calculus for the completion without axioms of the form A ⊃ A. The complexity of the proof can be bounded by partial cut-elimination such that the sequents in the new proof are constructed from literals and equations only. If the program has the cut-property, then it is possible to transform this proof into an SLDNF-computation of the goal.
The class of programs that have the cut-property is not decidable, but there are interesting, syntactically defined, decidable subclasses, like the class of decomposable programs. This class contains the definite programs and the allowed programs. We show that SLDNF-resolution is sound and complete for decomposable programs with respect to three-valued models of the completion. This theorem extends the completeness results of [3, 13, 18] .
It is also possible to prove the completeness of SLDNF-resolution for programs which have the cut-property directly, using model-theoretic methods (see [32] ). The proof-theoretic method, however, which we will use in this paper, gives more insight.
The motivation to use proof theory for analyzing SLDNF-resolution comes from the following observation. We consider the set of goals which have a finitely failed SLDNF-tree. This set is closed under the following structural rules.
For instance the contraction rule is read as follows. If the goal Γ, L, L finitely fails in SLDNF-resolution then also the goal Γ, L finitely fails in SLDNF-resolution. Since sequent calculi have exactly the same structural rules, is clear that there must be a strong correspondence between them and SLDNF-resolution. A natural question is then the following. How can we further restrict the rules of the sequent calculus C3(P ) such that it is complete for SLDNF-resolution for arbitrary programs? This question leads us to the calculus of Negation-as-Failure, NF(P ), and to an extension of SLDNF-resolution. Shepherdson calls this extension SLDNFS-resolution in [29] . We introduce three-valued possible world models as a new semantics for the completion of programs and prove that SLDNFS-resolution is sound and complete with respect to this semantics for arbitrary programs and goals. Hence from a logical point of view SLDNFS-resolution is fully justified, since it has a purely declarative semantics. The main point here is that the completeness theorem is for arbitrary programs and not just for a restricted class of programs. It is the first completeness result of this generality for an intelligible semantics like the three-valued possible world semantics.
For the calculus of Negation-as-Failure we use another principle from proof theory which goes back to Gentzen. It is the following idea. The sequent calculus LJ for intuitionistic logic can be obtained from the sequent calculus LK for classical logic by restricting sequents Γ ⊃ ∆ of LK to sequents where the right hand side ∆ is either empty or consists of a single formula only. In a similar way we obtain the calculus of Negation-as-Failure from C3(P ) by restricting sequents Γ ⊃ ∆ such that either ∆ is empty or ∆ consists of exactly one formula and Γ is a set of equations. Then we can show that a goal Γ finitely fails in SLDNFS-resolution if, and only if, the sequent Γ ⊃ is provable in NF(P ). Therefore in order to obtain the semantics of SLDNFS-resolution we only have to look for a semantics of the calculus of Negation-as-Failure. And in the same way as one obtains Kripke models from LJ as a semantics for intuitionistic logic, we obtain three-valued Kripke models from the calculus of Negation-as-Failure as a semantics for SLDNFS-resolution.
This paper contains the results of [31] . We assume that the reader is familiar with basic concepts from logic programming [20] , like unification and SLD-resolution, and with basic concepts from proof theory [9] , like sequent calculus and cut-elimination.
Cut-elimination theorems have been of interest in the context of logic because they provide insight into the nature of deduction. In this paper we try to show that they provide also insight into the nature of computations.
Related work
There are other proof-theoretic approaches to logic programming in the literature. In most cases, however, these approaches are conceptually different from our approach. In [22] , for example, a certain fragment of intuitionistic logic is taken as a new logic programming language. The proofs in this fragment are viewed as computations of a logic programming system and an interpreter has to find sequent proofs in this fragment. Thus, computation means proof search. This approach has been extended in [23] and [21] to higher order logic programming and λProlog. The difference between these approaches and our approach is that we do not use proof theory as a foundation of a new logic programming language but instead we use proof theory as a tool for analyzing the old problem of Negation-as-Failure in classical logic programming, in the sense of [1] and [20] .
In [4] , linear logic is used for this latter task. In our opinion linear logic is not appropriate for analyzing the problem of the semantics of Negation-as-Failure in classical logic programming, since contraction and weakening are unproblematic in this context. For example, if the goal Γ, L, L fails then also the goal Γ, L fails. Thus we have contraction in SLDNF-resolution. If the literal L, however, has side effects, for example, if it writes some characters on an output stream, then the goals Γ, L, L and Γ, L do not have the same effect.
The two formal systems C3(P ) and NF(P ) which we introduce in this paper are similar to systems used in [6, 11, 12, 25] . Those systems were obtained by a generalization of Horn clause programs. Horn clauses can be viewed as introduction rules in a natural deduction system. The corresponding elimination rules can then be viewed as a generalization of Negation-as-Failure. Our system C3(P ), however, was obtained as we were looking for a formalization of Fitting's three-valued semantics of the completion.
A variant of C3(P ) that uses unification explicitly and not implicitly by means of equality axioms was used by Girard in [10] for a new theory of generalized connectives in linear logic.
The calculus of Negation-as-Failure, NF(P ), is a simplification of the derivability relation 3I of [29] . Since we obtain NF(P ) as an intuitionistic variant of C3(P ), this gives a new structural justification for 3I .
Our paper is concerned with the question: what does SLDNF-resolution compute? It is not concerned with the question whether SLDNF-resolution is the right method to handle negation in logic programming.
SLDNF-resolution has been criticized because it does not detect loops through negative calls and it may repeatedly evaluate the same literal. For this reason many other semantics for negation in logic programming have been introduced, for example, the stratified semantics of [2] , the perfect model semantics of [24] , the wellfounded semantics of [33] and the stable model semantics of [8] . All these semantics distinguish one canonical Herbrand model, or a class of Herbrand models, of a logic program with negation as the semantics of the program.
Unfortunately already in the case of stratified logic programs, where all these semantics coincide, the canonical model can be of arbitrary arithmetical complexity. This means that for a stratified program of level n the canonical Herbrand model can be Σ 0 n+1 -complete. Thus, there exist stratified programs of level 1 for which the stratified semantics, the perfect model semantics, the stable semantics and the well-founded semantics are not recursively enumerable and cannot be computed. For applications this is not a serious problem. In the case of Datalog programs or deductive databases where we have only constants and variables and no function symbols, the canonical model can be computed and is generally considered as a robust and natural semantics.
Since we are interested in the semantics of SLDNF-resolution for programs with function symbols, there is another reason that we cannot restrict the semantics to Herbrand models only. Consider the following program which consists of the single clause R(f (x)): −R(x). We assume that SLDNF-resolution is sound with respect to a certain class of Herbrand models of this program. Then R(t) must be false in all these models for every closed term t, since R(t) fails finitely in SLDNF-resolution if t does not contain variables. Hence ∃x R(x) is also false in these models. Now, if SLDNF-resolution would be complete for the class then the goal R(x) should finitely fail in SLDNF-resolution. But this is not the case. The goal R(x) loops in SLDNF-resolution. Therefore we have to consider also non-standard models.
Basic notions
Let L be a fixed first order language with a set Rel of relation symbols and a set Fun of function symbols. The set Rel always contains the two symbols eq and fail. Fun can be finite or infinite. Relation symbols are denoted by Q, R. Function symbols are denoted by f , g. The arities of relation symbols and function symbols are given by the context. Variables are denoted by u, v, x, y. Sets of variables are denoted by V , W . Terms are built up from variables and function symbols in the usual way and are denoted by a, b, s, t. Terms are of the form x or f (t 1 , . . . , t n ). Formulas are built up from atomic formulas using ¬, ∧, ∨, ∀, ∃ and sometimes → and ↔ and are denoted by A, B. Formulas are of the form R(t 1 , . . . , t n ), ¬A, A∧B, A ∨ B, A → B, A ↔ B, ∀xA or ∃xA. Positive literals are atomic formulas of the form R( t ) and negative literals are negated atomic formulas of the form ¬R( t ). Literals are denoted by L. The expression s ≈ t stands for eq(s, t); ⊥ stands for fail; and stands for ¬fail. We use the following switching operator ∼ which acts on literals. If L is a positive literal A then ∼ L := ¬A. If L is a negative literal ¬A then ∼ L := A. The number of symbols ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔, ∀ and ∃ in a formula A is denoted by |A| . We write A[ x ] to indicate that all free variables of A are from the list x ; analogously, t[ x ] stands for a term with no variables different from x . A formula A( x ) or a term t( x ) may contain other free variables than x . The set of all free variables of a formula A or term t is denoted by vars(A) or vars(t).
A substitution θ is a finite set of bindings {x 1 /t 1 , . . . , x n /t n } such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n the term t i is different from the variable x i and for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n the variable x i is different from x j . We use small greek letters α, β, η, θ, σ, τ , ϕ, χ to denote substitutions. The application of a substitution θ to an expression E is written as Eθ and is obtained from E by simultaneously replacing the variables x i by the terms t i . The expression Eθ is called an instance of E. The substitution θ is called a renaming substitution for E if there exists a substitution α such that Eθα = E. We write E ≤ F if there exists a substitution θ such that Eθ = F . This means that E is less instantiated than F . The empty substitution or identity substitution is denoted by ε. The domain of a substitution θ, dom(θ), is defined as the finite set of variables {x | xθ = x}. The variables of a substitution θ, vars(θ), is defined as the finite set dom(θ) ∪ {vars(xθ) | x ∈ dom(θ)}. The restriction θ V of a substitution θ to a set of variables V is the substitution {(x/t) ∈ θ | x ∈ V }. For unexplained notions we refer to [19] and [20] . If A is a positive literal, 0 ≤ n, and L 1 , . . . , L n are positive or negative literals then an expression of the form A: −L 1 , . . . , L n is called a program clause or simply a clause. The positive literal A is the head of the clause and the sequence L 1 , . . . , L n is the body of the clause. A logic program or simply a program is a finite set of program clauses. A goal or a query is an expression of the form ?− L 1 , . . . , L n . Finite lists of literals are denoted by capital greek letters Γ, ∆, Λ, Π. Thus clauses will be denoted by A : − Π and goals by ?− Γ or simply by Γ (we omit the '?−' sign). The empty goal is denoted ∅.
The 2-ary relation eq and the 0-ary relation fail are built-in relations. We assume that every program contains the clause eq(x, x) and that this is the only clause defining the relation eq. Furthermore we assume that the program does not contain any clause that defines fail.
Clark's completion of logic programs
We summarize now the definition of the completion of a logic program. The completion of a logic program was introduced by Clark in [5] . Let P be a program and R be a n-ary relation symbol of L. We assume that there are m clauses in P whose head is of the form R(. . .) and that the i-th clause is of the form
This clause has k(i) literals in its body. The defining formula for R is defined by
and the completed definition of R in P is the formula
The cases m = 0, n = 0, or k(i) = 0 are treated in a natural way. The empty disjunction is the constant ⊥ and the empty conjunction is the constant .
[if f is n-ary, g is m-ary, and f = g]
is a term, t(x) = x, and x occurs in t(x)] Table 1 : CET : Clark's equational theory for L.
The completion of P , comp(P ), is obtained from P by taking all completed definitions of all relations of L and the equality and freeness axioms of Table 1 for L, the so called theory CET (Clark's equational theory).
The axiom
. . , y n ) is not needed because it is derivable from comp(P ). Similarly, the completed definition of eq is a tautology and can be omitted. We assume that the axiom ¬fail is part of the logic and therefore for a relation R which is not defined in P we have ∀ x ¬R( x ).
SLDNF-and SLDNFS-resolution
We will use two extensions of SLDNF-resolution which have already been mentioned by Clark in [5] and by Shepherdson in [27] . In both extensions it is allowed that negative selected literals may contain free variables. The first extension can be described by the following two rules for a positive literal A[ x ]. Since we want completeness we cannot restrict rule (2) to ground literals only. Consider, for example, the program P which contains a simple fact R(x). Then comp(P ) |= ¬∃x¬R(x). Hence the query ?− ¬R(x) must fail. Indeed, according to rule (2) this is the case, since R(x) returns answer ε.
The first extension of SLDNF-resolution can be defined in the following way. Let P be a program. The idea is that R k,n is the set of pairs Γ, θ such that Γ has a successful SLDNF-derivation of rank k and length less than or equal to n with answer θ, and F k,n is the set of goals which have a finitely failed SLDNF-tree of rank k and depth less than or equal to n. The number k is the depth of nesting of negation as failure calls. In other words, Γ, θ ∈ R k,n or Γ R k,n θ means 'the goal Γ returns answer θ' or 'the goal Γ succeeds with answer θ'; Γ ∈ F k,n means 'the goal Γ finitely fails'. The following definition can be found in [18] . Since we want most general answers, we have to parametrize the sets R k,n by a set of protected variables V . The sets R[V ] k,n and F k,n are the least sets satisfying the following five closure conditions. 
l,m θ, l < k, m < ω, and θ is a renaming substitution for A then Γ ∈ F k,n .
Condition (F1) includes the following special case. If Γ = ∆ · A and for each variant B : − Π of a clause of P the head B does not unify with A then Γ ∈ F k,n . We write Γ R k,n θ for Γ R[∅] k,n θ. We define R <k := {R l,m | l < k, m < ω} and F <k := {F l,m | l < k, m < ω}. We write Γ R k,n 'yes' if there exist substitutions α and β such that Γ R k,n α and Γαβ = Γ, i. e. α is a renaming substitution for Γ. We write Γ R θ (resp. Γ ∈ F) if there exist k and n such that Γ R k,n θ (resp. Γ ∈ F k,n ). Using these notations condition (F2), for instance, can be rewritten as follows.
(F2) If Γ = ∆ · ¬A and A R <k 'yes' then Γ ∈ F k,n .
The second extension of SLDNF-resolution, SLDNFS-resolution, was used by Shepherdson in [29] . In the same way as the sets R k,n and F k,n have been defined for SLDNF-resolution the sets R 
* , F * are treated similarly. More precisely, in the rest of the paper one can either omit the superscript * everywhere or replace it everywhere by s. It is convenient also to have the slightly more general sets I * k,n which consist of those goals which have an unrestricted SLDNF-refutation in the sense of Lloyd [20] . In the terminology of [30, 31] a goal Γ is in I * k,n if every literal in Γ has an implicationtree of rank k such that the total number of nodes is less than or equal to n. Let I * k,n be the least sets of goals satisfying the following three closure conditions.
We define I * := {I * k,n | k < ω, n < ω}. One of the most important and most surprising observations is that for every program P the set F * is closed under the following structural rules.
(
These structural rules play an important role in the next sections. Since the proofs of these structural properties are very technical, we have collected them in an appendix.
A formalization of Fitting's three-valued semantics of the completion
Following [7] and [17] we will use the strong three-valued logic of Kleene [16] where we have the three truth values t (true), f (false) and u (undefined). The truth functions ¬, ∧, ∨, , of [16] and the relation ≤ on the set of truth values {t, f , u} are characterized by the following properties. Let v, v i and w be elements of {t, f , u}.
(1) ¬f = t, ¬t = f , ¬u = u, (2) v ∧ w = t if, and only if, v = t and w = t, (3) v ∧ w = f if, and only if, v = f or w = f , (4) v ∨ w = t if, and only if, v = t or w = t, (5) v ∨ w = f if, and only if, v = f and w = f , (6) i∈I v i = t if, and only if, for all i ∈ I, v i = t, (7) i∈I v i = f if, and only if, there exists an i ∈ I such that v i = f , (8) i∈I v i = t if, and only if, there exists an i ∈ I such that v i = t, (9) i∈I v i = f if, and only if, for all i ∈ I, v i = f , (10) v ≤ w is equivalent to the two statements
(1) M is a non empty set: the universe of M, (2) ∼ is a binary relation on M ,
The universe M of M is denoted by |M|. In three-valued structures functions and equality are interpreted in a two-valued manner and relations are interpreted as functions into {t, f , u}. For every term t[ x ] and elements a ∈ M the value M(t[ a ]) ∈ M is defined as usual. The truth value of a formula A is determined according to the truth functions above. For a formula A[ x ] and elements a ∈ M the truth value M(A[ a ]) ∈ {t, f , u} is defined by
We will use the following notions.
The notion comp(P ) |= 3 A means that the formula A is true in all three-valued models of comp(P ). The use of three-valued logic as a semantics for Negation-as-Failure is motivated by the following two example programs. Let P 1 be the program with the single clause a : − ¬a. Then comp(P 1 ) contains the formula a ↔ ¬a and is inconsistent; the atom a is provable from comp(P 1 ), but the goal ?− a does not succeed, it loops.
Let P 2 be the program {a : − b; a : − ¬b; b : − b}. Then comp(P 2 ) contains the formula a ↔ b ∨ ¬b; the atom a is provable from comp(P 2 ), but the goal ?− a does not succeed, it loops. Now, if we want completeness for Negation-as-Failure then we need a logic in which a ↔ ¬a is not contradictory and in which the tertium non datur is not valid. We obtain this in a very simple way. We take the well-known sequent calculus LK for classical logic but without axiom sequents of the form A ⊃ A. An axiom sequent A ⊃ A means that A is false or A is true and this is what we want to avoid.
What is a sequent? A sequent is an expression of the form Γ ⊃ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite sets of formulas without implication and equivalence. The comma denotes union. Thus Γ ∪ ∆ ∪ {A} is denoted by Γ, ∆, A. We say that a sequent
The three-valued sequent calculus for the completion of P , C3(P ), was introduced in [30] and consists of the axioms and rules in Table 2 . In [30] it was called LK(P ). Now, we prefer the name C3(P ) and we prefer to work with finite sets and not with finite sequences. We write C3(P ) Γ ⊃ ∆ it the sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ is derivable with the rules of Table 2 .
The three-valued sequent calculus for the completion is a very weak system. For example, it is not possible to prove the commutativity of ∧ in it, since we cannot express this statement without equivalence; and equivalence is not captured by C3(P ). However, it is possible to show that if the sequent Γ ⊃ ∆, A ∧ B is provable in C3(P ) then the sequent Γ ⊃ ∆, B ∧ A is provable in C3(P ). It is important to have only monotonic connectives like ¬, ∧ and ∨ in C3(P ). The equivalence ↔ is not monotonic, since for example u ↔ t is f , but t ↔ t is t.
Now it turns out that the system C3(P ) is exactly the formalization of Fitting's three-valued consequence relation |= 3 . In [30] the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 6.1. Let P be a program. Then comp(P ) |= 3 Γ ⊃ ∆ if, and only if,
It would also be possible to formulate the system C3(P ) in a Tait-like fashion that uses only one-sided sequents and where negation is not a basic symbol of the language but a defined operator on formulas. Then the number of logical rules would be divided by two. The reason that we do not take this approach is the following. We will also consider an intuitionistic version of C3(P ), called NF(P ), which is obtained from C3(P ) by restricting the sequents Γ ⊃ ∆ to sequents where ∆ is empty or ∆ consists of exactly one formula and Γ is a set of equations. If C3(P ) would be given with one-sided sequents then this construction would not be possible.
The formalization of Fitting's three-valued semantics, the calculus C3(P ), is now the starting point for a sequence of proof-theoretic investigations which leads Axioms:
( to new results on SLDNF-and SLDNFS-resolution.
Cut-elimination and the completeness of SLDNF-resolution
In [18] Kunen proves that for allowed programs and allowed goals SLDNF-resolution is sound and complete with respect to three-valued models of the completion. We want to extend these results to larger classes of programs. Soundness of SLDNFresolution means the following. For any program P and goal L 1 , . . . , L n :
(These statements can be derived from Lemma 8.7 below using the fact that if NF(P ) A then comp(P ) |= 3 A.) Completeness of SLDNF-resolution means the converse of (1) and (2). This is not true for arbitrary programs. We will derive a completeness result from a more general theorem. We will show that a program P is negation-complete if, and only if, it has the cut-property. This result is interesting, since the first property, negation-complete, is defined semantically in terms of threevalued models, and the second property, the cut-property, is defined in terms of SLDNF-resolution only. We need the following two definitions.
Definition 7.2. A program P has the cut-property iff, for every goal Γ, for every clause A : − L 1 , . . . , L n of P and every substitution σ,
The following program is an example for a program which does not have the cut-property. Let P = {isc(c); q(X) : − isc(X); q(X) : − ¬isc(X)}. Let Γ be the goal ?− ¬isc(X) and consider the clause q(X): −¬isc(X). For σ we take the identity substitution. Now Γ, ∼ ¬isc(X) is the goal ?− ¬isc(X), isc(X) and this goal is in F. But Γ, ¬q(X) is the goal ?− ¬isc(X), ¬q(X) and this goal is not in F, since ?− isc(X) does not succeed answer 'yes' and ?− q(X) does not succeed with answer 'yes'. It is easy to see that negation-complete implies cut-property. Theorem 7.3. If a program P is negation-complete then it has the cut-property.
Proof. Assume that P is negation-complete, A : − L 1 , . . . , L n is a clause of P , and σ is a substitution such that, for all 1
Since P is negation-complete, we obtain that (M 1 , . . . , M k , ¬Aσ) ∈ F. Hence P has the cut-property. 2
For the converse of this theorem we proceed as follows. We assume that P has the cut-property and show that a proof of ¬∃(
In a first step we consider only the axiom sequents. How can we interpret them in terms of SLDNF-resolution? Remember that every program contains the built-in relation eq and that the definition of eq is eq(x, x). The following lemma interprets the axiom sequents of C3(P ) in SLDNF-resolution.
Lemma 7.4. For any terms s, s i , t, t i of L the negation of Clark's equality and freeness axioms are in F. In other words the following goals are in F.
(1) ?− ¬eq(t, t).
Quantifier-free program rules:
Assume that the defining formula for the n-ary relation symbol R of L in P is
The i-th positive R-introduction rule is
The negative R-introduction rule is
( * ) If the variables u are not free in R(s 1 , . . . , s n ), Γ ⊃ ∆. The i-th positive R-introduction rule has n + k(i) premisses. The negative R-introduction rule has m premisses. The quantifier-free program rules for QF(P ).
(2) ?− eq(s, t), ¬eq(t, s).
[if f is n-ary and 1
[if f is n-ary, g is m-ary, and f = g] (7) ?− eq(t(s), s).
[if t(x) is a term, t(x) = x, and x occurs in t(x)]
Proof. Consider, for example, goal (3). If eq(t 1 , t 2 ) and eq(x, x) are not unifiable then there is no derived goal using eq(t 1 , t 2 ) and (3) is in F. Otherwise the only goal derived from (3) using eq(t 1 , t 2 ) and the input clause eq(x, x) is of the form ?− eq(t 2 θ, t 3 θ), ¬eq(t 1 θ, t 3 θ), where t 1 θ = t 2 θ.
If eq(t 2 θ, t 3 θ) and eq(y, y) are not unifiable then the goal is in F. Otherwise the only goal derived from it using eq(t 2 θ, t 3 θ) and the input clause eq(y, y) is of the form ?− ¬eq(t 1 θσ, t 3 θσ), where t 2 θσ = t 3 θσ. But this goal is in F, since t 1 θσ = t 3 θσ and the goal ?− eq(t 1 θσ, t 3 θσ) returns answer 'yes'. 2
It is not possible to interpret arbitrary sequents containing complex formulas in a similar manner. Therefore we have to eliminate complex formulas in proofs of simple sequents which contain only literals. For this purpose we replace the program rules of C3(P ) by quantifier-free program rules and obtain a new system QF(P ). The system QF(P ) consists of the axioms, the logical rules and the cut of Table 2 and of the quantifier-free program rules of Table 3 . We will show that C3(P ) and QF(P ) prove the same sequents. One direction is easy. If a sequent is provable in QF(P ) then it is provable in C3(P ), since the quantifier-free program rules are derivable in QF(P ).
In the following definition QF(P ) n r Γ ⊃ ∆ means the the sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ has a proof in QF(P ) of depth less than or equal to n with cut rank less than r. The cut rank is the maximal complexity of cut formulas in the proof. Definition 7.5. We define QF(P ) n r Γ ⊃ ∆ by induction on n.
(1) If Γ ⊃ ∆ is an axiom of QF(P ) then we have QF(P ) n r Γ ⊃ ∆ for all n, r ∈ ω.
(2) If Γ ⊃ ∆ is the conclusion of a logical rule or a quantifier-free program rule of QF(P ) with premisses
If Γ ⊃ ∆ is the conclusion of a cut with premisses Γ ⊃ ∆, A and A, Γ ⊃ ∆ and cut formula A, QF(P ) m1 r Γ ⊃ ∆, A and QF(P ) m2 r A, Γ ⊃ ∆, m 1 < n, m 2 < n, and |A| < r then QF(P ) n r Γ ⊃ ∆. We write QF(P ) Γ ⊃ ∆ if there exist n, r < ω such that QF(P ) n r Γ ⊃ ∆; we write QF(P ) r Γ ⊃ ∆ if there exists an n < ω such that QF(P ) n r Γ ⊃ ∆.
The proofs of the following three lemmata are easy and therefore we omit them.
we need the following stronger lemma.
Lemma 7.9. Let the defining formula for the relation symbol R of L in P be
a is a sequence of terms, z is a sequence of variables, and
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. Note that if n = 0 then
is not the principal formula of the last rule then the claim follows immediately by the induction hypothesis. Otherwise the last rule was an introduction of ∃ or, if z is the empty sequence, an introduction of ∧. In the first case there exists a k < k and a term
If the last rule was an introduction of ∧ then there exists a k < k such that
Now we apply ∧-inversion and the induction hypothesis and, by the quantifier-free positive R-introduction rule, we can conclude that QF(P )
Proof. It remains to show that the program rules of C3(P ) are admissible in
, Γ ⊃ ∆ then we first apply ∨-inversion, ∃-inversion, and ∧-inversion to D R [ s ] on the left-hand side. By the quantifier-free negative R-introduction rule, we can conclude that QF(P ) R( s ), Γ ⊃ ∆.
If
on the right-hand side. By the previous lemma, we obtain that
In a proof of a sequent of literals not every formula needs to be a literal, since formulas of arbitrary complexity can be eliminated by a cut. Therefore, the first thing we have to do is to bound the complexity proofs. This can be done with a partial cut elimination. The following two lemmas are standard and we omit their proofs. Proof. By induction on m + n. 2
We do not eliminate all cuts in a proof but only the non-atomic cuts. Atomic cuts are harmless, since the cut rule is valid for F.
From this lemma we obtain immediately the following partial cut-elimination lemma. It says that if a sequent is provable in QF(P ) then it has a proof in which all cut formulas are atomic, i. e. equations or positive literals. the sequent is provable then the associated goal fails in SLDNF-resolution. Since sequents are sets and goals are lists the transformation of a goal into a list in not unique. But since the set of finitely failed goals F is closed under contraction, we do not need uniqueness.
Theorem 7.14. Let P be a program which has the cut-property and Γ ⊃ ∆ be a sequent consisting of literals only. If QF(P )
Proof. The proof is by induction on k. Assume that QF(P ) k 1 Γ ⊃ ∆. Then Γ ⊃ ∆ is an axiom, the conclusion of a negation introduction rule, the conclusion of a cut, or the conclusion of a program rule.
Axiom. If Γ ⊃ ∆ is an axiom of QF(P ) then it was shown in Lemma 7.4 that Γ · ∼ ∆ ∈ F.
Logical rules. If Γ ⊃ ∆ is a conclusion of a negation introduction rule then there is nothing to prove.
Cut. If Γ ⊃ ∆ is the conclusion of a cut then there exists an atomic formula A and a k < k such that QF(P ) Program rules. Assume that the defining formula for the n-ary relation symbol R of L in P is
(1) If Γ ⊃ ∆ is the conclusion of a positive R-introduction rule then there exists a positive literal R(s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ ∆, an 1 ≤ i ≤ m, terms a and a k < k such that
By the induction hypothesis,
Since P has the cut-property, we obtain that Γ · ∼ ∆ · ¬R(t i,1 [ a ] , . . . , t i,n [ a ]) ∈ F. Now we apply Lemma 10.10 and obtain that Γ · ∼ ∆ · ¬R(s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ F and, by contraction, Γ · ∼ ∆ ∈ F.
(2) If Γ ⊃ ∆ is the conclusion of a negative R-introduction rule then there exists a positive literal R(s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ Γ and a k < k such that
We have to show that R (s 1 , . . . , s n ) · Γ · ∼ ∆ ∈ F. Assume now that 1 ≤ i ≤ m and that θ is a most general unifier of R(s 1 , . . . , s n ) and
. By the substitution rule for F, we have
Since i was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain that R(s 1 , . . . , s n )·Γ·∼ ∆ ∈ F and, by contraction, Γ·∼ ∆ ∈ F.
2
Note that for the proof of the previous theorem it is important to have no axioms of the form A ⊃ A, because for most programs goals of the form ?− A, ¬A do not fail. Consider for example the simple program consisting of the only clause p : − p. Then the goal ?− p, ¬p loops. Now we are ready to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 7.15. If a program P has the cut-property then it is negationcomplete.
Proof. Assume that P has the cut-property and that
Until now we have only considered negative goals. In order to bring the results on negative goals in relationship to positive goals we need the following theorem. 
Proof. Assume that P is a negation-complete program, ?− L 1 , . . . , L n is a goal and that
Since P is negation-complete, (¬A) ∈ F, which by definition means that A R 'yes'. If L i is a negative literal ¬A then comp(P ) |= 3 ¬∃(A). Since P is negation-complete, A ∈ F, which by definition means that ¬A R 'yes'. Hence, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have L i R 'yes', and, by Lemma 10.3 (4), we obtain that (L 1 , . . . , L n ) R 'yes'. 2
This theorem says nothing on computed answers. In order to handle computed answers we need the following two definitions which are the analoga to the definition of negation-complete and cut-property. 
Definition 7.18. A program P has the lifting-property for the goal Γ iff for every substitution σ if Γσ ∈ I then there exists a substitution θ such that Γ R θ and Γθ ≤ Γσ.
These two definitions are not equivalent like the definitions of negation-complete and the cut-property. We have, however, the following theorem.
Theorem 7.19. Let P be a program and Γ be a goal.
(1) If P is answer-complete for Γ then P has the lifting-property for Γ. (2) If P has the cut-property and the lifting-property for Γ then P is answercomplete for Γ.
Proof. Assume that P is answer-complete for the goal ?− L 1 , . . . , L n and that σ is a substitution such that ( . . . , L n )σ. Hence P has the liftingproperty for ?− L 1 , . . . , L n .
Assume now that P has the cut-property, the lifting-property for ?− L 1 , . . . , L n , and that σ is a substitution such that
There are programs which have the lifting-property for some goal but are not answer complete for it. Let P be the following program.
isc(c). p(X) : − isc(X). p(X) : − ¬isc(X).
q : − ¬p(X). r : − ¬q.
The program P has the lifting-property for the goal ?− r, since r / ∈ I. But P is not answer complete for ?− r, since comp(P ) |= 3 r and the goal ?− r does not succeed.
It is clear that it is not decidable whether a program is negation-complete or not. In [31] it is shown that the set of negation-complete programs is Π 0 2 -complete. But there is a decidable, syntactically defined, class of programs, the class of decomposable programs, which has the cut-property and the lifting-property. This class contains the definite programs and the allowed programs. Definition 7.20. Let P be a program and P ⊆ P .
(1) We say that a variable x is bounded in Γ iff x occurs in a positive literal A in Γ such that no clause from P \ P does unify with A. (2) P is called an admissible subprogram of P iff for every clause of P every variable x of the head is bounded in the body. (3) A goal Γ is called an admissible goal for P iff every variable x that occurs in a negative literal of Γ is bounded in Γ. (4) The program P is called decomposable iff P is an admissible subprogram of P and if for every clause of P the body of the clause is an admissible goal for P .
It is obvious that every definite program P is decomposable with respect to ∅ and every allowed program P is decomposable with respect to P . Therefore the set P ⊆ P is in a certain sense a measure how definite P is or how allowed it is.
Example 7.21. Let P be the following set of clauses.
nat(0). nat(s(X)) : − nat(X). list([]). list([X|L]) : − nat(X), list(L).
Let P be the program P together with the following clauses.
Then the program P is decomposable with respect to P . We assume that the user gives a program P together with a subset P ⊆ P and the system checks whether P is decomposable with respect to P . This test can be done in quadratic time.
Lemma 7.22. Let P be decomposable with respect to P ⊆ P . Then P has the lifting-property for admissible goals and P has the cut-property.
Proof. See [31]. 2
Putting all together we obtain the following completeness theorem for SLDNFresolution and decomposable programs.
Theorem 7.23. Let P be decomposable with respect to P ⊆ P .
Note that in part (2) of the theorem there is no condition on ?− L 1 , . . . , L r . In [18] Kunen shows that for call-consistent programs and strict goals three-valued consequences of the completion and classical consequences are the same. Therefore Theorem 7.23 is a strengthening of the completeness results in [3, 13, 18] .
The calculus of Negation-as-Failure and SLDNFS-resolution
The calculus of Negation-as-Failure is an intuitionistic fragment of C3(P ) in the language with ¬, ∧, ∨ and ∃ only. Θ, Σ denote finite sets of equations; finite sets of equations or formulas are denoted by Γ, ∆. The objects which are derived in the calculus of Negation-as-Failure are sequents of the form Σ ⊃ A or Γ ⊃, i. e. sequents, where the left-hand side consists only of equations and the right-hand side consists of exactly one formula, or sequents, where the right-hand side is empty. The calculus of Negation-as-Failure is obtained from C3(P ) by restricting all rules to sequents of this form. The axioms and rules are given in Table 4 . The main feature of NF(P ) are the asymmetric rules for negation. The notions NF(P ) n r Γ ⊃ ∆, NF(P ) r Γ ⊃ ∆ and NF(P ) Γ ⊃ ∆ are defined like in Definition 7.5. We write NF(P ) A as a Axioms:
is a term, t(x) = x, and x occurs in t(x)] (8) ⊥, Γ ⊃ Logical rules:
( * ) If the variable u is not free in ∃xA(x), Γ ⊃.
Cut: Table 4 : The calculus of Negation-as-Failure for P : NF(P ).
shortcut for NF(P ) ⊃ A. The calculus of Negation-as-Failure corresponds exactly to SLDNFS-resolution. 
In the rest of this section we will be concerned with the proof of this theorem. We start with some easy lemmata for NF(P ).
To formalize unification and SLDNFS-resolution in the calculus of Negation-asFailure we need the following technical lemma on equality.
Lemma 8.5. Let σ and θ be two substitutions and let Θ be the finite set of equations {xσ ≈ xθ | xσ = x or xθ = x}.
(1) NF(P ) Θ ⊃ aσ ≈ aθ for every term a.
The following two lemmas are formalized versions of theorems of Clark [5] .
Lemma 8.6. [Formalization of unification] (1) If θ is an idempotent most general unifier of R(a 1 , . . . , a n ) and R(b 1 , . . . , b n ) then for every binding x/t of θ we have R(a 1 , . . . , a n ) and R(b 1 , . . . , b n ) are not unifiable then NF(P ) a 1 ≈ b 1 , . . . , a n ≈ b n ⊃.
Proof. Induction on the number of steps in the unification algorithm for R(a 1 , . . . , a n ) and R(b 1 , . . . , b n ). 2 Theorem 8.7. [Formalization of SLDNF-and SLDNFS-resolution] Let P be an arbitrary program and L 1 , . . . , L n be a goal.
Proof. Statements (1) and (2) follow from the following two statements using Lemma 10.5 (6).
(1) and (2) are proved simultaneously by main induction on k and side induction on n. We assume that
, where
Case (I1). If Γ is empty then there is nothing to prove. Case (I2). Assume that Γ = ∆ · R(s 1 , . . . , s r ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, R(s 1 , . . . , s r (s 1 , . . . , s r ) .
Case (I3). Assume that Γ = ∆ · ¬A, A ∈ F * <k and ∆ ∈ I * k,n−1 . By the induction hypothesis on k, we have NF(P ) A ⊃ and therefore NF(P ) ¬A.
Case (F1). Assume that Γ = ∆ · R(s 1 , . . . , s r ) and that every goal derived from Γ using R(s 1 , . . . , s r ) is in F * k,n for some n < n. Let u be a string of variables which do not occur in Γ and let 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If R(s 1 , . . . , s r ) and
Otherwise let θ be an idempotent most general unifier of the two literals R(s 1 , . . . , s r ) and
k,n for some n < n and, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain that NF(P )
By the formalization of unification, we obtain that
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ p and hence, by the use of cut, Case (F2). Assume that Γ = ∆ · ¬A and A R * <k 'yes'. Then A ∈ I * k ,n for some k < k. By the induction hypothesis on k we obtain NF(P ) A and therefore NF(P ) ∆, ¬A ⊃. 2
The elimination lemma and the partial cut-elimination for NF(P ) are proved in the same way as in Sect. 7. Therefore we can assume that in a proof of a sequent in NF(P ) only atomic cuts occur.
We say that a substitution σ is a solution of a set Σ of equations iff, for all equations (s ≈ t) ∈ Σ, we have sσ = tσ. Using this notion we can interpret proofs of the calculus of Negation-as-Failure in the following way.
(2) If NF(P ) n 1 Σ, Γ ⊃ and Γ consists only of literals then for every solution σ of Σ we have Γσ ∈ F s .
Proof.
(1) and (2) are proved simultaneously by induction on n. Note that (s ≈ t) ∈ I s if, and only if, s = t. We assume that (1) (1)- (5) of Table 4 every solution of the equations on the left-hand side is also a solution of the equation on the right-hand side. For sequents (6) and (7) there exists no solution of the left-hand side. For sequent (8) we have to remark that ⊥ = fail and fail ∈ F s .
Logical rules.
(1) Assume that L = ¬A and NF(P ) n 1 A, Σ ⊃ for some n < n. If A is an equation s ≈ t then sσ and tσ are not unifiable, since otherwise, by the induction hypothesis, the empty goal is in F s . In every case, by the induction hypothesis, Aσ ∈ F s and hence ¬Aσ ∈ I s . (2) Assume that Γ = ∆ · ¬A and NF(P ) n 1 Σ ⊃ A for some n < n. By the induction hypothesis, Aσ ∈ I s and, by
Cut.
(1) Assume that NF(P ) n 1 Σ ⊃ s ≈ t and NF(P ) n 1 s ≈ t, Σ ⊃ L for some n < n. By the induction hypothesis, (s ≈ t)σ ∈ I s and this implies sσ = tσ.
Therefore σ is a solution of s ≈ t, Σ and by the induction hypothesis, Lσ ∈ I s .
(2) Assume that NF(P ) n 1 Σ ⊃ A and NF(P ) n 1 A, Σ, Γ ⊃ for some n < n, and Σ ⊆ Σ. Since |A| < 1, A must be atomic. By the induction hypothesis, we have Aσ ∈ I s . If A is an equation then σ is a solution of A, Σ and, by the induction hypothesis, Γσ ∈ F s . Otherwise by the induction hypothesis, (A · Γ)σ ∈ F s and, by Lemma 10.6, it follows that Γσ ∈ F s .
Program rules. We assume that the defining formula of R is
(1) Assume that L = R(s 1 , . . . , s r ) and NF(P )
. . , s r ] for some n < n. By Lemma 8.4, there exists an 1 ≤ i ≤ m and terms a such that we have NF(P )
, Γ ⊃ for some n < n. Let u be a string of variables which are not in vars(Γ) ∪ dom(σ). By Lemma 8.4, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ m and θ be a most general unifier of the atoms R(s 1 σ, . . . , s r σ) and
Hence (L 1 , . . . , L r )σ ∈ I s , and by Lemma 10.11, there exists a substitution θ such
. . , L r ⊃ and, by the previous lemma, (L 1 , . . . , L r ) ∈ F s . 2
The semantics of the calculus of Negation-as-Failure
In this section we introduce a sound and complete semantics for the calculus of Negation-as-Failure. Since the calculus of Negation-as-Failure corresponds exactly to SLDNFS-resolution, we obtain in this way a sound and complete semantics for SLDNFS-resolution. First we define the relation comp(P ) |= 3K A, which means that the formula A is valid in all three-valued Kripke models of the completion of P . Three-valued Kripke structures are similar to Kripke structures for intuitionistic predicate logic with equality. A three-valued Kripke structure M is a 6-tuple
and all a ∈ M , there exists a formula
all α ∈ K and all a ∈ M , there exists an equation
The most important feature of three-valued Kripke models is the modal interpretation of negation. The asymmetric interpretation can be justified as follows. A negative literal ¬A is true if ¬A succeeds; ¬A succeeds if A fails; A fails if, for all clauses that unify with A, the body fails. A negative literal ¬A is false if ¬A fails; ¬A fails if A succeeds.
It is easy to see that if a three-valued Kripke structure M is a model of the completion comp(P ) then for every n-ary relation symbol R of Rel , for all α ∈ K and all a 1 , . . . , a n ,
Since we always consider models of the completion, we did not include this congruence property in the definition of three-valued Kripke structures.
The interpretation of implication will only be used in the axioms of CET. There are several other possible interpretations of → which would also be suitable for this task. We have chosen the simplest one.
The partial ordering on {t, f , u} is extended to three-valued Kripke structures in a pointwise fashion as follows. Let M and N be two three-valued Kripke structures. Then M ≤ N means that M is equal to N except in the interpretation of the relation symbols, and for all relation symbols R and all α ∈ K and a ∈ M we have R
It is easy to see that for any formula A[ x ] without implication and equivalence if M ≤ N then for all α ∈ K and a ∈ M we have
In analogy to the operator Φ P for three-valued structures (see [7, 17] ) an operator Ψ P for three-valued Kripke structures is defined as follows. Let P be a program and M be the three-valued Kripke structure
Then Ψ P (M) is the three-valued Kripke structure
where for a relation symbol R of Rel with defining formula
If M is a three-valued Kripke structure then Ψ P (M) is also a three-valued Kripke structure, since α ≤ β and
The operator Ψ P is monotonic. A structure M satisfying CET is a fixpoint of Ψ P if, and only if, M is a model of comp(P ).
Proof. Ψ P is monotonic on the complete lattice {N | N ≤ M}. So it must have a fixpoint there. 2
It is easy to see that the calculus of Negation-as-Failure is sound with respect to three-valued Kripke models of the completion. If NF(P ) Γ ⊃ ∆ then comp(P ) |= 3K Γ ⊃ ∆. The calculus of Negation-as-Failure is also complete for this semantics.
is not provable in NF(P ). We will construct a three-valued Kripke structure M of the form
Having such a structure we use the fixpoint lemma and obtain a structure N ≤ M such that N |= 3K comp(P ) and
The set K of M will be a tree consisting of finite sequences of formulas denoted by α, β and it will be defined by induction on the length of α. We set α ≤ β if lh(α) ≤ lh(β) and, for all i < lh(α), we have (α) i = (β) i . In other words, α ≤ β if, and only if, α is a prefix of β.
For every sequence α we need a set V α of variables. To manage the use of variables in the following construction it is easier to divide the set of variables into the sets V α in advance. We define V := { x } ∪ {u ,n | n ∈ ω} and if β = α * A then V β := V α ∪ vars(A) ∪ {u β,n | n ∈ ω}, where u β,n / ∈ V α . For an infinite set Γ we say that the sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ is provable in NF(P ) if there exists a finite subset Γ 0 ⊆ Γ such that NF(P ) Γ 0 ⊃ ∆. The main construction is as follows. We define by induction on the length of α, in each subcase by induction on k, finite sequences Γ α,k of formulas and countable sets Σ α,k of equations, such that the sequent Γ α,k , Σ α,k ⊃ is not provable in NF(P ). Then we set
The sets Γ α and Σ α are constructed such that all variables of Γ α and Σ α are from the set V α . In the base cases we set Γ ,0 := ∅ and Σ ,0 := Θ[ x ] (resp. Γ ,0 := Λ[ x ] and Σ ,0 := ∅). If A is a formula and β is already in K and the sequent A, Σ β ⊃ is not provable in NF(P ) then we set α := β * A , add α to K and define Γ α,0 := A and Σ α,0 := Σ β . Assume that Γ α,k and Σ α,k have been constructed. Then Γ α,k+1 and Σ α,k+1 are defined in the following way. The sets Γ α and Σ α have the following properties.
(1) Γ α is a countable set of formulas.
(2) Σ α is a countable set of equations. (1) M is the set of all terms. (2) If f is a n-ary function symbol and t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ M then f M (t 1 , . . . , t n ) := f (t 1 , . . . , t n ). (3) For s, t ∈ M let s ∼ α t if, and only if, NF(P ) Σ α ⊃ s ≈ t. (4) For a relation symbol R and a ∈ M we define
It is now easy to verify that M is a three-valued Kripke structure and that M satisfies Clark's equational theory CET. In a next step one proves by induction on the complexity |A| of a formula A the following properties.
Statements (a) and (b) are proved simultaneously. The critical case is when A is of the form ¬B. (a) We assume that ¬B ∈ Γ α . Suppose that M α (¬B) = f . By definition, we have M α (B) = t and, by (b), NF(P ) Σ α ⊃ B. But then NF(P ) ¬B, Σ α ⊃ and NF(P ) Γ α , Σ α ⊃. Contradiction. Therefore we have M α (¬B) = f .
(b) We assume that M α (¬B) = t. Suppose that NF(P ) / B, Σ α ⊃. Then there exists a β ∈ K such that α ≤ β and B ∈ Γ β . By (a), we have M β (B) = f and therefore M α (¬B) = t. Contradiction. Hence we have NF(P ) B, Σ α ⊃ and NF(P ) Σ α ⊃ ¬B.
For (c) one uses the inversion rules (2), (4), (6) of Lemma 8.4 . The critical case is when A is of the form ¬B and NF(P ) Σ α ⊃ ¬B. Suppose that M α (¬B) = f . Then M α (B) = t and, by (b), NF(P ) Σ α ⊃ B. We have NF(P ) ¬B, Σ α ⊃ and, by the use of cut, we obtain that NF(P )
We now show that
Finally we show that
Putting Theorems 8.1 and 9.2 together we obtain the following completeness theorem for SLDNFS-resolution. 
The important point in this theorem is that it is for arbitrary programs and arbitrary goals. We make an example. Consider the following program P of [29] .
isc(c). notisc(X) : − ¬isc(X). q : − ¬isc(X), ¬notisc(X).
Then we have in comp(P ) the following formulas.
From these formulas we can derive, using only equality and equivalence logic, the formula q ↔ ∃X(¬X ≈ c∧¬¬X ≈ c). From this formula we can derive in intuitionistic logic ¬q. But the goal ?− q is not in F s , since isc(X) does not return answer 'yes'
and notisc(X) is not in F s . According to the completeness theorem above there must exist a three-valued Kripke model M of comp(P ) in which ¬q is not valid. Let K := {0, 1} with 0 ≤ 1 and let M be the set of all terms of L in which at most the variable X occurs. For a, b ∈ M let
We have that X ∼ 0 c, but X ∼ 1 c. The relations isc M i , notisc M i and q M i for i = 0, 1 are defined according to the completed definitions. In this way we obtain a threevalued Kripke model M of comp(P ). In this model we have M 0 (isc(X)) = f and M 1 (isc(X)) = t. Hence M 0 (¬isc(X)) = u and M 0 (¬notisc(X)) = u. Therefore M 0 (q) = u and M |= 3K ¬q.
In [29] Shepherdson introduces the default operator T + ω (P ) as an alternative to the operator comp(P ). T + ω (P ) is a recursively enumerable first order theory which is obtained from P in ω steps. He proves the following statements for arbitrary programs P . The statements are for classical logic.
Statement (2) is only for positive literals, since in classical logic ¬∃ x (R( x )∧¬R( x )) is provable, but the goal ?− R( x ), ¬R( x ) does not fail in most cases. Using both Shepherdson's completeness result and our completeness result, we obtain that a formula ∀(L 1 ∧ . . . ∧ L n ) or a formula ¬∃(A 1 ∧ . . . ∧ A n ) is provable from T + ω (P ) in classical logic if, and only if, it is true in all three-valued Kripke models of comp(P ).
Appendix: Structural properties of SLDNF-and SLDNFS-resolution
In this appendix we prove the properties of SLDNF-and SLDNFS-resolution used in the previous sections. We need the following notion.
If Γ = ∆ · A, B : − Π is a clause and ϕ is a most general unifier of A and B then we say that the goal (∆ · Π)ϕ is derived form Γ using A, the input clause B : − Π and the most general unifier ϕ. 
Proof. Assume that (Γ · ∆)α = Γ · ∆ , ∆θβ = ∆ , V = vars(Γ) \ vars(∆), and V ∩ vars(θ) = ∅. Then we have ∆α = ∆θβ and V ∩ vars(∆θ) = ∅. Now we define γ := α V ∪ β vars(∆θ). If x ∈ vars(∆) then xθγ = xθβ = xα. If x ∈ vars(Γ) \ vars(∆) then x ∈ V and xθγ = xγ = xα. Hence we obtain that (Γ · ∆)θγ = (Γ · ∆)α and therefore (Γ · ∆)θ ≤ Γ · ∆ . 2
The next lemma corresponds to the Lemmas 2 and 3 of [26] or Lemma 6 of [30] . Since we are not aware of a proof of it using the inductive definition of R and F, we prove it here again. Statement (1) is not important, but it is used for the induction. Note, that if V is a set of protected variables, V ∩ vars(Γ) = ∅, and
Proof. Statement (3) follows from (1) by setting Γ 1 := Γ, Γ 1 := Γθσ, Γ 2 := ∅, Γ 2 := ∅, and V := ∅. Statement (4) can be derived also from (1) . If L i R k,ni 'yes' for 1 ≤ i ≤ r then there exist substitutions θ i and σ i such that L i R k,ni θ i and L i θ i σ i = L i for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and we can apply (1) several times by setting Γ i := Γ i .
Statements (1) and (2) are proved simultaneously by main induction on k. Statement (1) is proved by side induction on m + n, (2) by side induction on n. In order to prove (1) we assume that
Case (R1). If Γ 1 = ∅ and Γ 2 = ∅ then we can take θ := ε. Case (R2). Assume that Γ 1 = A · ∆, vars(B : − Π) ∩ vars(Γ 1 ) = ∅, ϕ is a most general unifier of A and B, (Π · ∆)ϕ R k,m−1 χ, and θ 1 = (ϕχ) vars(Γ 1 ). Let B : − Π be a variant of B : − Π such that vars(B :
, by the lifting lemma, there exists a most general unifier ϕ of A and B such that
Case (R3). Assume that Γ 1 = ¬A · ∆, A ∈ F <k , and ∆ R k,m−1 θ 1 . Then
Since A ≤ A , by the induction hypothesis on k, we obtain that A ∈ F <k . We set W := V ∪ vars(A ) \ vars(∆ · Γ 2 ). Since W ∩ vars(∆ · Γ 2 ) = ∅, by the induction hypothesis on m+n, there exists a substitution θ such that ∆ ·Γ 2 R[W ] k,m−1+n θ and (∆ · Γ 2 )θ ≤ ∆θ 1 σ 1 · Γ 2 θ 2 σ 2 . By the inequality lemma, we obtain that also
The cases, where the selected literals are in Γ 2 are treated analogously. In order to prove (2) we assume now that Γ ∈ F k,n .
Case (F1). Assume that Γ = A · ∆ and that every goal derived from Γ using A is in F k,m for some m < n. Let B : − Π be a variant of a clause of P and θ be a most general unifier of Aσ and B. Let B : − Π be a variant of B : − Π such that vars(B : − Π ) ∩ vars(Γ) = ∅. By the lifting lemma, there exists a most general unifier ϕ of A and B such that (Π · ∆)ϕ ≤ (Π · ∆σ)θ. Since (Π · ∆)ϕ ∈ F k,m for some m < n, by the induction hypothesis on n, we obtain that (Π · ∆σ)θ ∈ F k,m for some m < n. Since the clause B : − Π was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain that (A · ∆)σ ∈ F k,n .
Case (F2). Assume that Γ = ¬A · ∆ and A R <k 'yes'. By the induction hypothesis on k, we have Aσ R <k 'yes' and therefore (¬A · ∆)σ ∈ F k,n . 2 Proof. Statement (3) follows from (1) . Note that in (1) we do not need the assumption Γ ≤ Γ as in the previous lemma. Statements (1) and (2) are proved simultaneously by main induction on k. The proof goes analogously to the proof of the previous lemma except in case (R3).
Case (R3). Assume that Γ = ¬A · ∆, ϕ is a substitution such that Aϕ ∈ F Proof. The proof of (1) is by main induction on k and side induction on n. We assume that Γ · ∆ ∈ F * k,n and ∆ ∈ I * k . Case (F1). Assume that Γ = A · Λ and every goal derived from A · Λ · ∆ using A is in F * k,m for some m < n. Let B : − Π be a variant of a clause of P and ϕ be a most general unifier of A and B. Then, the goal (Π · Λ · ∆)ϕ is in F * k,m for some m < n. Since ∆ϕ ∈ I * k , we can apply the induction hypothesis and obtain that (Π · Λ)ϕ ∈ F * k,m . Since the clause B : − Π was chosen arbitrarily, A · Λ ∈ F * k,n . Assume that ∆ = Λ·A and every goal derived from Γ·Λ·A using A is in F * k,m for some m < n. Since Λ · A ∈ I * k , by the previous lemma, there exists a clause B : − Π and a substitution σ such that A = Bσ and Λ · Πσ ∈ I * k . Without loss of generality we may assume that vars(B : − Π) ∩ vars(Γ · Λ · A) = ∅. By the lifting lemma, there exists a most general unifier ϕ of A and B such that (Γ · Λ · Π)ϕ ≤ Γ · Λ · Πσ. By assumption, (Γ · Λ · Π)ϕ ∈ F * k,m for some m < n and therefore Γ · Λ · Πσ ∈ F * k,m for some m < n. Since Λ · Πσ ∈ I * k , we can apply the induction hypothesis and obtain that Γ ∈ F * k,n . Case (F2). Assume that Γ = ¬A · Λ and A R * <k 'yes'. Then we have Γ ∈ F * k,n . Assume that ∆ = Λ · ¬A and A R * <k 'yes'. By the previous lemma A ∈ I * l for some l < k. By assumption, Λ · ¬A ∈ I * k and therefore A ∈ F * <k . By the induction hypothesis on k, we obtain that ∅ ∈ F * <k which is not possible. Statement (2) follows from (1) . Assume that Γ R * θ and Γ ∈ F * . Then we have Γθ ∈ I * and Γθ ∈ F * and, by (1), the empty goal is in F * which leads to a contradiction. 2
In [26] Shepherdson remarks that it is never to late to fail a goal.
Lemma 10.7. [Persistence of failure] If ∆ · A ∈ F * k,n , B : − Π is a clause of P , and A = Bσ then ∆ · Πσ ∈ F * k,n . Proof. The proof is by induction on n. We assume that ∆ · A ∈ F * k,n , B : − Π is a clause of P , and A = Bσ.
Case (F1). Assume that ∆ = B · Λ and that every goal derived from B · Λ · A using B is in F * k,m for some m < n. Let C : − Σ be a variant of a clause of P and ϕ be a most general unifier of B and C. We have (Σ · Λ · A)ϕ ∈ F * k,m for some m < n. Since Aϕ = Bσϕ, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain that (Σ · Λ · Πσ)ϕ ∈ F * k,m . Since the clause C : − Σ was chosen arbitrarily, the goal B · Λ · Πσ is in F * k,n . Assume that ever goal derived from ∆ · A using A is in F * k,m for some m < n. Since A = Bσ, by the lifting lemma, there exists a derived goal (∆ · Π )ϕ ≤ ∆ · Πσ. Since (∆ · Π )ϕ ∈ F * k,m for some m < n, we obtain that ∆ · Πσ ∈ F * k,n . Case ( Proof. The proof is by induction on n. We assume that Γ · A ∈ F * k,m and Γ · ¬A ∈ F * k,n . Case (F1). Assume that Γ = B · ∆ and that every goal derived from B · ∆ · ¬A using B is in F * k,n for some n < n. Let C : − Π be a variant of a clause of P and ϕ be a most general unifier of B and C. The goal (Π · ∆ · ¬A)ϕ is F * k,n for some n < n. Since Bϕ = Cϕ and (B · ∆ · A)ϕ ∈ F * k,m , by the previous lemma, we have (Π · ∆ · A)ϕ ∈ F * k,m . Now we apply the induction hypothesis and obtain that (Π · ∆)ϕ ∈ F * k,m+n . Since the clause C : − Π was chosen arbitrarily, the goal B · ∆ is in F * k,m+n . Case (F2). If Γ = ¬B · Λ and B R * <k 'yes' then Γ ∈ F * k,m+n . Otherwise A R * <k 'yes'. But then A ∈ I * <k , and, by the consistency lemma, we have Γ ∈ F * k,m which implies Γ ∈ F * k,m+n . 2 Theorem 10.9. [Contraction rule for
The proof is by induction on n. We assume that Γ · L · L ∈ F * k,n . Case (F1). Assume that L is positive and every goal derived from Γ · L · L using the first L is in F * k,m for some m < n. Let A : − Π be a variant of a clause of P and ϕ be a most general unifier of L and A. Then (Γ · Π · L)ϕ ∈ F * k,m for some m < n. Since Lϕ = Aϕ, by persistence of failure, (Γ · Π · Π)ϕ ∈ F * k,m . We now apply the induction hypothesis several times and conclude that (Γ · Π)ϕ ∈ F * k,m . Since the clause A : − Π was chosen arbitrarily, Γ · L ∈ F * k,n . Assume that Γ is of the form A · Λ and that every goal derived from A · Λ · L · L using A is in F
